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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
t

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

:

v.

:

MARIO JOSE VELASQUEZ,

:

Defendant-Appellant.

Case No. 900218-CA

Priority No. 2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction of possession a
controlled substance, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1990).

This Court has jurisdiction to hear

the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp.
1990).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court
correctly denied defendant's motion to suppress evidence, ruling
that the stop was not pretextual.

Because of the trial court's

advantageous position in determining the factual basis for a
motion to suppress, this Court will not reverse the trial court's
factual evaluation unless its findings are clearly erroneous.
State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 327 (Utah Ct. App.), cert.
granted,

P.2d

(Utah 1989).

However, in assessing the

trial court's legal conclusions based upon its factual findings,
this Court applies a correction of error standard.

-1-

Id.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
U.S.

Const. Amend. IV t
The right of people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Mario Jose Velasquez, was charged with two

counts of possession of a controlled substance, a third degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1990)
(Record [hereinafter "R."] at 8).

Defendant filed a motion to

suppress the evidence against him which was denied (R. 28).
Defendant then entered a conditional guilty plea to count I,
specifically preserving his right to appeal the trial court's
denial of his motion to suppress pursuant to State v. Sery, 758
P.2d 935, 939 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (R. 35, 43). The State moved
to dismiss count II and sentencing was stayed pending appeal to
this Court (R. 35, 43).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On November 30, 1990, Officer Allen Hedenstrom's
attention was drawn to a car with mismatched license plates

as

he watched it park at approximately 9th South and State Street in
Salt Lake City (Transcript of suppression hearing, March 20, 1990
[hereinafter "T."] at 4).

When he observed the car a short while

later, further east on 9th South, Officer Hedenstrom stopped the
The front plate number read 398 BHC while the rear plate number
read 114 DCF.
-2-

vehicle and approached defendant, the sole occupant and driver,
to ask for his driver's license and registration (T. 4-5).
Defendant replied that he had no driver's license and showed
officer Hedenstrom a previous traffic citation for driving
without a license, which had been issued to a Jeff Martinez, as
identification (T. 5, 8). Defendant was then arrested for
2
driving without a license (T. 6).

The car was impounded and

inventoried in accordance with department policy, to avoid
vandalization or other damage, because defendant had no license
and there was no one else present to take his car (T. 6-7, 14).
During the course of the inventory, Officer Hedenstrom opened an
unlocked cash box located on the floor near the driver's seat in
which he found substances later identified as cocaine and heroin
(T. 7). Another officer transported defendant to the jail while
Officer Hedenstrom remained with defendant's vehicle until it
could be towed to the impound lot (T. 12).
In denying defendant's motion to suppress the evidence
seized, the trial court issued written findings.

(A copy of the

court's Ruling on Motion to Suppress is attached hereto as
Addendum A ) .

The trial court specifically found that (1) the

stop was based on a violation of law and was not pretextual; (2)
defendant's arrest was justified by his failure to produce a
driver's license, his prior citation for driving without a
license, and his giving false information to a police officer;
(3) the impound was justified to avoid leaving the vehicle
Officer Hedenstrom could not recall whether defendant produced
a valid registration for the vehicle (T. 5).

-3-

unattended; and (4) the inventory search was proper (R. 28).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
By failing to precisely aver his allegations of pretext
concerning the initial stop of his vehicle in the trial court,
defendant has waived consideration of his argument on appeal to
this Court.

In his motion to suppress and at the hearing on that

motion, defendant did nothing more than claim that the stop of
his vehicle was pretextual.

He did not argue that the

hypothetical reasonable officer would not have made a stop under
the circumstances, nor did he refer the court to any evidence
produced by the State or by him to suggest that the hypothetical
reasonable officer would not have stopped him in this case.
Defendant also failed to precisely aver his arguments concerning
the propriety of the subsequent impound and inventory search in
the trial court; thus, consideration of these issues is similarly
waived,
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS WAS PROPER.
Defendant asserts that Officer Hedenstrom's stop of his
vehicle for a traffic violation constituted an unconstitutional
pretext stop, and, therefore, the trial court should have
suppressed the cocaine and heroine subsequently seized pursuant
to an inventory search of the impounded vehicle.
Under the fourth amendment, to lawfully stop a vehicle
for investigatory purposes, an officer must have at least a
reasonable suspicion that either the vehicle or an occupant has
-.4-

violated or is about to violate the law (i.e., a traffic or
equipment regulation, or any applicable criminal law). Delaware
v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661, 663 (1979);

State v. Gibson, 665

P.2d 1302, 1304 (Utah), cert, denied, 464 U.S. 894 (1983); State
v. Holmes, 774 P.2d 506, 507 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

A stop of a

vehicle is, of course, also justified when the officer has
probable cause to believe that either the vehicle or an occupant
has violated the law.

Ibid.

Defendant does not claim that the

Delaware v. Prouse standard was not met when Officer Hedenstrom
stopped his vehicle for having different license plates attached
to the front and the rear of the vehicle.

Rather, he claims that

the stop was an unconstitutional pretext stop, which "occurs when
the police use a legal justification to make the stop in order to
search a person or place, or to interrogate a person, for an
unrelated serious crime for which they do not have the reasonable
suspicion necessary to support a stop."

United States v. Guzman,

864 F.2d 1512, 1515 (10th Cir. 1988).
In State v. Sierra 754 P.2d 972 (Utah Ct. App. 1988),
disavowed on other groundsf State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 689
(Utah 1990), this Court set forth the standard for determining
whether an unconstitutional pretext stop has occurred:

"[I]f a

hypothetical reasonable police officer would not have stopped the
driver for the cited traffic offense, and the surrounding
circumstances indicate the stop is a pretext, the stop is
unconstitutional." Id. at 979.

The test is an objective one,

focusing on whether the reasonable officer would have made the
stop under the circumstances, not whether the officer could have

-5-

made a stop.

Ici. at 977-78; Guzman, 864 F.2d at 1517.

See 1

LaFave, Search and Seizure, §1.4(e) at 15 n.44.1 (Supp. 1991).
On appeal, defendant challenges the continued viability of
Sierra, asserting that under article I, Section 14 of the Utah
Constitution, evidence of a police officer's subjective intent is
a relevant consideration in evaluating pretext claims (Brief of
Appellant [hereinafter "Br. of App."] at 9-17). However, because
defendant did not raise or develop his argument in the trial
court, the state constitutional question should not be addressed
by this Court. State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 327-28 (Utah Ct.
App.), cert, granted,
P.2d
(Utah 1989). Accordingly, the
State does not address this question except to clarify that an
objective standard is appropriate.
In support of his state constitutional argument under article
I, Section 14, defendant notes that although this Court maintains
that reference to the officer's subjective state of mind is
inappropriate, in practice, the Court has referred to an
officer's subjective state of mind in assessing allegations of
pretext stops (Br. of App. 13). As examples, defendant cites
State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 883 (Utah Ct. App. 1990);
Sierra, 754 P.2d at 979-980; and State v. Lovegren, 798 P.2d
767, 768 n.3, 771 n.10 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Defendant's
observation has merit in so far as it points out an apparent
inconsistency between the objective standard this Court purports
to follow and its reference to evidence of the officer's
subjective intent or motivation in evaluating allegations of
pretext in the above cases. However, mere recognition of this
past inconsistency does not, as suggested by defendant, require
the conclusion that a subjective test is either necessary or
appropriate in resolving allegations of pretext. See 1 LaFave,
Search and Seizure, § 1.4(e) at 95 (1987).
As additional support for his argument defendant asserts that
the United States Supreme Court has condoned the use of evidence
of an officer's subjective intent and, as a result, federal case
law on the subject is confusing (Br. of App. nn.8-9). However,
defendant overconstrues the case law which either does not
discuss the proposition for which it is cited or involves facts
and circumstances which invoke concerns different from those
which arise in connection with a pretextual vehicle stop.
Moreover, in Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 470-71 (1985), the
Supreme Court clearly set forth an objective standard for
determining whether a fourth amendment violation has occurred.
Specifically, the Court stated that the test turns on an
assessment of the officer's conduct in light of the facts and
circumstances confronting him at the time, and not on the
officer's subjective intent or motivation. Id. (quoting Scott v.
United States, 436 U.S. 128, 136 (1978)). See also Horton v.
California,
U.S.
, 110 S.Ct. 2301, 2308-09 (1990) (Court
notes that evenhanded law enforcement is best achieved by the
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A.

Defendant Failed to Precisely Aver His Allegations
of Pretext Surrounding the Initial Stop of His
Vehicle in the Trial Court; Thus, He has Waived
Consideration of the Issue on Appeal to this
Court.

In his motion to suppress and at the hearing on that
motion, defendant did nothing more than claim that the stop of
his vehicle was pretextual and cite Sierra to the court.

He

neither stated the "hypothetical reasonable officer" standard nor
argued that the hypothetical reasonable officer would not have
made a stop under the circumstances.

Nor did he refer the court

to any evidence produced by the State or by him to suggest that
the hypothetical reasonable officer would not have stopped him in
this case.

See State v. Lovegren, 798 P.2d at 771 n.10.

In

short, he did not even suggest that police officers do not
routinely stop vehicles for the particular traffic violation
which provided the basis for the stop of his vehicle.

See Ibid.

The absence of any of these arguments to the trial court should
preclude consideration of defendant's pretext argument on appeal.
See State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 660 (Utah 1985) ("[Wjhere a
defendant fails to assert a particular ground for suppressing
unlawfully obtained evidence in the trial court, an appellate
court will not consider the ground on appeal.");

State v.

Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1144 (Utah 1989) (because the grounds for
objection raised on appeal were not specifically or distinctly

Cont. application of objective standards of conduct, rather
than standards that depend upon the subjective state of mind of
the officer).
4
Defendant does not attack the validity of his arrest for
driving without a license and for giving false information.
-7-

stated to the trial court, those grounds were not presercved for
appellate review).

Defendant's conclusory allegation of pretext

and passing reference to Sierra were simply insufficient to
preserve the pretext issue he now presents on appeal.

Indeed,

the inadequacy of defendant's argument regarding pretext is
reflected in the trial court's ruling, which does not analyze the
pretext question in terms of the hypothetical reasonable officer
but instead disposes of it on the ground the stop was legal
because it was clearly based upon a reasonble suspicion of a
violation of the law (R. 30; see Addendum A).

This ruling is

actually nothing more than a conclusion that the stop did not
violate Delaware v. Prouse; it does not address the question of a
permissable pretext stop, which necessarily presumes that the
5
stop complies with Prouse .
Insofar as Sierra suggests that the Prouse reasonable suspicion
test and pretextual stop test are components of a single test
upon which to evaluate the validity of a vehicle stop, it is
incorrect. The Prouse standard and the pretext stop standard are
two distinct standards to be applied independently. The former
provides the basis upon which to evaluate the reasonableness of
the intial seizure of the vehicle (which is usually for a
misdemeanor traffic violation), while the latter is relevant to
only the evidence of another crime (usually more serious than the
traffic violation) discovered pursuant to the vehicle stop. This
is made clear in United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512 (10th
Cir. 1988), where the Tenth Circuit treated the government's
objection to the court's adoption of a Sierra-type pretextual
stop standard as follows:
Contrary to the Government's argument, our
approach will not "severely" curtail "the
ability of the New Mexico State Police . . .
to enforce traffic laws." Brief of the
Appellant—United States of America at 14.
No prosecution for violation of a traffic
regulation will be affected. Police officers
may always issue appropriate citations to
drivers who violate traffic regulations.
Only evidence of a more serious crime

-8-

B.

Defendant has Waived Consideration by this Court of
the Propriety of the Impound and Inventory Search
of his Vehicle by Not Precisely Avering These
Issues as Grounds for Suppressing the Evidence
Against Him in the Trial Court.

On appeal to this Court, defendant asserts there was no
statutory authorization or other circumstances justifying the
impoundment of his vehicle and that the subsequent inventory
search was pretextual because it was not conducted in conformity
with established reasonable procedures; therefore, the trial
court should have suppressed the evidence seized pursuant to
State v. Hyqh, 711 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985) (Br. of App. 22).
However, because defendant failed to precisely aver
these particular grounds for suppressing the evidence to the
trial court, and because there is nothing in the record to
indicate that the argument was "unavailable or unknown to
defendant at the time he filed his motion to suppress," he has
not preserved these issues for review by this Court.
P.2d at 660-61.

Carter, 707

See also Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14, 16

(Utah 1988) (requirement of a specific objection on the record
ensures that the trial court will understand the basis of the
objections and have an opportunity to correct any errors as well
as assure that the reviewing court will have a record of the
grounds asserted below; thus, where the trial court has not been
given a fair opportunity to avoid an error, the reviewing court
will not usually consider any claim based on that error).
5
Cont. discovered pursuant to such a stop
will be excluded if the stop was
unconstitutionally pretextual.
864 F.2d at 1518.
-9-

Defendant's motion to suppress, which was not accompanied by a
supporting memorandum, was narrowly focused on his allegation of
a pretextual stop and did not address the propriety of the
impound or inventory search (R. 25; a copy of defendant's Motion
to Suppress is attached hereto as Addendum B).

Furthermore,

defense counsel failed to precisely aver the arguments he now
raises on appeal in his argument at the motion to suppress
hearing:
MR. VALDEZ: The leading constitutional
cases, is the Opperman case and the Harris
case, but the State case, I think, relevant
is State v. Sierra. I would ask the Court to
read that. I think Mr. Lemcke, you are aware
of the State v. Sierra case. I have copies I
would like to provide to the Court. Relevant
page is 977 in the Sierra case, if I may
approach the bench. I would ask that the
Court read these and take the matter under
advisement, and advise the attorneys as to
whether or not — what the Court's decision
would be after the Court has read the
decisions.
. . .

MR. VALDEZ Opperman is the general case in
terms of inventory searches, Judge. And I
think if you read that . . . you will learn
something about inventory searches.
The problem is, Judge, what we have heire he
says it was an inventory search. He also
says it was a search incident to arrest.
Now, which is it? In terms of the inventory
search, there is no law against what items
were taken out. None was provided in the
police report. He says there is probably one
somewhere, although that hasn't been produced
by the State who has the burden of showing
that it was a proper search.
In addition to that, Judge, the other thing
is to, and you will see that in the State v,
Sierra, they have indicated, yes, a police
officer may however stop an automobile for a
traffic violations committed in the officer's
-10-

presence. Well, it had two different plates
on it, although it was properly registered.
But it goes on to say in Sierra on page 977:
"It is impermissible for law enforcement
officers to use a misdemeanor arrest as a
pretext to search for evidence of a more
serious crime."
It is our position that that is what occurred
here, Judge, and the items that were found
ought to be suppressed.
(T. 15, 17-18; a copy of counsel's argument before the trial
court is attached hereto as Addendum C) (emphasis added).
Defense counsel's "conclusory allegations" and vague reference to
the inventory search at the suppression hearing were simply
insufficient to afford the trial court a "fair opportunity" to
consider the propriety of the impound and inventory search in
this case.

Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d at 16.

At least as much specificity should be
required in a pretrial objection to the
admissibility of evidence, i.e., a motion to
suppress, as is required in an oral objection
made during the course of a trial. In fact,
even more specificity could reasonably be
required because the pretrial objection can
be researched and written under relatively
calm circumstances, as distinguished from an
extemporaneous objection made in the heat of
trial.
Carter, 707 P.2d at 660-61 n.2 (quoting State v. Johnson, 16 Or.
App. 560, 519 P.2d 1053 (1974)).

Moreover, the trial court

treated defense counsel's argument as a secondary challenge to
the general validity of inventory searches, as is demonstrated by
its reliance on South Dakota v. Oppermanf 428 U.S. 328 (1976), in
briefly finding that the impound was justified and that the

-11-

inventory search was proper (R. 31-32; see Addendum A ) .
Therefore, this Court may properly decline to address these
issues on appeal• 7

The language from Opperman quoted in the trial court's ruling
merely notes the necessity and validity of inventory searches
conducted as a matter of course after police have properly
impounded a vehicle. See Opperman, 428 U.S. at 369.
7
Should this Court determine that defense counsel marginally
preserved the propriety of the impound and inventory search for
review and that these issues are determinative, this case should
be remanded for a rehearing on these issues. Defense counsel's
argument at the motion to suppress hearing was simply inadequate
to alert the State or the trial court that the propriety of the
subsequent impound and inventory were at issue. Therefore,
because neither of the parties focused on these issues at the
motion to suppress hearing, the trial court was not able to make
detailed findings of fact and the record before this Court is
simply inadequate for meaningful review. State v. Marshall, 791
P.2d 880, 882 n.l, 887 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (remand for rehearing
where the parties and the trial judge did not focus on critical
issues at suppression hearing). See Combs v. United States, 408
U.S. 224, 228 (1972) (remand appropriate where record before
Court was "virtually barren of the facts necessary to determine
whether petitioner had standing).
Notwithstanding the above, should this Court look past
defendant's waiver to address the merits of this case based on
the record currently before it, the State acknowledges that
Officer Hedenstrom's conclusory testimony alone may be
insufficient for this Court to determine whether the inventory
was conducted pursuant to "established reasonable procedures."
See Hygh 711 P.2d at 268 n.17 (procedural order setting forth
police department standards was introduced in its entirety at
trial; thus, on appeal, the Utah Supreme Court was able to
compare the written policy with the officer's conduct). See also
Ex Parte Boyd, 542 So.2d 1276, 1282-83 (Ala. 1989) (where
officer's conclusory testimony that inventory was done in
compliance with department regulations was held to be
insufficient, court noted the record must sufficiently reflect
what the policy is, describe the policy in such a way that its
reasonableness can be reviewed, and present adequate evidence of
what the employed criteria were); Rabadi v. State, 541 N.E.2d
271, 275 (Ind. 1989) (state must do more than offer the mere
statement of a police detective that the search was conducted as
a routine inventory to make required showing that its actions
come within the inventory exception).

-1 0-

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully submits
that this Court should either affirm the ruling of the lower
court or remand for rehearing on the issues of the propriety of
the impound and inventory search.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3/* day of December, 1990
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

kltioAA. fawJlfiA-

(IAN DECKER
Assistant Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the
foregoing Appellee's Brief was mailed, postage prepaid, to
Elizabeth Holbrook, Attorney for Appellant, 424 East 500 South,
Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 this 3/

day of December,

1990.
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

I n l i v <l.<x>'*.V:: •/•.c'.'^;

MAR 2 1 1930
W§£> ^ ,

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

RULING ON MOTION TO SUPPRESS

Plaintiff,

CIVIL NO.

901900313 FS

vs.
MARIO JOSE VELASQUEZ,
Defendant.

Defendant's
20,

1990.

Motion to Suppress came on for hearing on March

The

interpreter,

defendant

and

the

was

State

present

was

with

represented

Evidence was received, the case argued, and
upon

presented

by

both

counsel.

The

counsel

and

by its counsel.

authorities

relied

Court took the matter

under advisement.
The Court now rules as follows.
The only witness, the arresting officer, testified that
motor

vehicle

driven

by

the

plates on the front and rear,
The

driver

could

not

defendant had different license

therefore,

produce

a

he

driver's

pulled

no

driver's

license.

it over.

license.

produce a prior traffic citation wherein he had been
having

the

He did

cited

for

During this stop, the defendant

A^^^C

STATE V. VELASQUEZ

PAGE TWO

RULING ON MOTION

gave different names to the officer.

No

as

a registration card in the

to

whether

or

not

there

was

evidence

was

offered

vehicle.
Based

upon

the

above, the officer arrested the defendant.

Since he was alone, the
police

department

automobile

procedures,

was

an

inventory

automobile wherein a cash box was found
driver's

seat

containing

a

impounded.

on

substance

was

the

Following
made of the

floor

believed

to

controlled substance, and paraphernalia in relationship
same.

Defendant

was

booked

for

driving

license, giving false information to

the

by

the

be a

to

the

without a driver's

police

officer,

and

pretext

to

possession of a controlled substance.
Defendant

argues

unreasonable
Amendment

search

to

therefore,

the

the

that
and

the

stop

seizure

in

Constitution
fruits

of

of

such

was

a

violation

the

United

illegal

of the Fourth
States

search

and,

should

be

suppressed.
The

State

argues

that

the

stop

search, but for violation of the law
officer.

The

search

was not a pretext for a

in

the

presence

of

the

that occurred was an inventory search in

relationship to impounding the vehicle.
Section

41-1-43, Utah

"two identical registration

Code Ann., requires the issuance of
plates11

for

every

motor

vehicle

STATE V, VELASQUEZ

other

than

a
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motorcycle,

trailer,

RULING ON MOTION

etc.

The

further provides that the plates so issued may

said

Section

be

removed

not

from the vehicle or used upon any other vehicle.
Section 41-1-48, Utah Code Ann., requires that
vehicle,

except

a

motorcycle,

trailer,

every

etc.,

motor

shall

have

attached to the front of the vehicle one license plate, and

the

other license plate to the rear.
The automobile driven by the defendant at the
stop

had

different

rear of the car.
violation

of

license

of

the

attached to the front and

Therefore, operation of such car would

the law.

stop this motor

plates

time

be

in

The officer had a right, and a duty, to

vehicle

because

of

this

violation

of

law.

Therefore, the stopping of this vehicle was a valid stop.
Upon further inquiry, the driver
not

produce

a

driver's

license,

of

the

automobile

could

but

did

produce

prior

a

citation indicating he had previously been arrested for
without a license.

He also gave the officer different names.

Based upon all of the above, the officer
arresting

the

defendant and booking him.

was

stop

was

the officer.

justified

in

The stopping of this

vehicle was not a mere pretext to searching of
The

driving

the

automobile.

made for violation of the law in the presence of

The subsequent arrest and booking

were

justified

under the totality of the circumstances.

coo
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The impounding
defendant

was

streets.

Police

inventory

of

of

alone

the
and

vehicle

was

justified

since

the

the vehicle could not be left on the

authorities

such

RULING ON MOTION

vehicles

are
at

justified

the

time

stated in South Dakota v. Opperman, 428

in

making

of impounding.

U.S.

364,

49

an
As

L.Ed.2d

1000 (1976):
When vehicles are impounded, local police
departments
generally
follow
a routine
practice of securing and inventorying the
automobile's
contents.
These procedures
developed in response to three
distinct
needs:
the
protection
of the owner's
property
while
in
remains
in
police
custody...
the protection of the police
against claims or disputes over lost or
stolen property... and the protection of the
police
from
potential
danger....
The
practice has been viewed as essential to
respond to incidents of theft or vandalism.
The

above

court

procedures

have

throughout

the

the

federal

inventory

been

went

on

to

uniformly

state
upheld

that such caretaking
by

state

courts

various jurisdictions, and that the majority of

courts

procedures

of
as

appeals

have

reasonable

likewise

police

United States Supreme Court upheld the police
impounded vehicle under the facts of that case.

"sustained

intrusions." The
inventory

of

an

STATE V. VELASQUEZ

PAGE FIVE

We hold that the stop was valid,
that
in

the

this

impounded.
above.

as

RULING ON MOTION

was

the

arrest, and

inventory by the police authorities of the automobile
case

was

The

justified

because

the

car

was

being

inventory was justified for the reasons stated

The discovery of the suspected evidence was made

during

a legal search of this vehicle.
Based upon the above, defendant's

Motion

to

Suppress

evidence taken during the inventory search is denied.
Dated this <C\ I

day of March, 1990.

the

ADDENDUM B

r1.
JAMES A. VALDEZ (3308)
Attorney for Defendant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone:
532-5444
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•
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v/t.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR STATE LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MOTION TO SUPPRESS

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff
v.

Case No. 901900313FS
JUDGE LEONARD H. RUSSON

MARIO JOSE VELASQUEZ,
Defendant

The defendant, MARIO JOSE VELASQUEZ, by and through his
attorney of record, JAMES A. VALDEZ, hereby moves the Court to
suppress all evidence taken from the defendant in violation of the
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I,
Section 14 of the Utah Constitution and the following grounds:
1)

Search of the vehicle should have been conducted

pursuant search warrant.
2)

No probable cause to stop.

3)

There was a pretext stop and subsequent to arrest there

was no crime in the presence of the officer for which
defendant should of been arrested.
DATED this

day of March, 1990.

JA1MES A'. VALDEZ
orney for Defendant

0002

NOTICE OF HEARING
TO THE COUNTY ATTORNEY AND THE CLERK OF THE COURT:
You and each of you please take notice that the
above-entitled matter will come on regularly for a hearing
on Tuesday, the 20th day of March, 1990, at the hour of 9:00 a.m.
before the Honorable LEONARD H. RUSSON, Third District Court Judge.
Please govern yourselves accordingly.
DATED this 6>

day of March, 1990.

^ic/iA

vTW J

DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the County Attorney's
office, 231 East Fourth South, Salt Lake City, Utah this
of March, 1990.
S L I V E R E D B^

MAR 0 61990
.JOEY FINOCCHIC

day

ADDENDUM C
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THE COURT: Okay, go ahead.

2

1

MR. VALDEZ: The leading constitutional cases,

3

I is the Opperman case and the Harris case, but the State

4

J case, I think, relevant is State vs. Sierra.

5

I the Court to read that.

I would ask

I think Mr. Lemcke, you are

6

aware of the State vs. Sierra case.

I have copies I

7

J would like to provide to the Court.

8

J in the Sierra case, if I may approach the bench.

9

I ask that the Court read these and take the matter under

Relevant page is 977
I would

10

J advisement, and advise the attorneys as to whether or

11

I not — what the Court's decision would be after the Court

12

J has read the decisions.

13

THE COURT:

Mr. Lemcke.

14

I

15

I necessary to take it under advisement.

16

J Court can see the contentions here of Mr. Valdez is that

17

I it was a pretext search.

18

I evidence of that or a pretext style.

19

I

20

J inventory, which is a regular police procedure and the

21

I drugs were found then.

22

I the allegations why these particular findings should be

23

I suppressed.

24

I

25

I should have been conducted pursuant to a search warrant.
I

MR. LEMCKE:

Your Honor, I think it is not
I think that the

It is clear there is no

The search of the car was done pursuant to an

There is no reason on the face of

The allegations are a search of a vehicle

15

t %+* % \ v v ^ \

~i % - ~ i •

1

J There were none pursuant to an inventory.

At the time

2

I there was no probably cause to go get a warrant.

3

J merely procedural as a vehicle is inventoried before it

4

I is taken to the impound lot.

5

I

6

I there was probable cause "Here goes a vehicle down the

7

I street with two different license plates," which is

8

I certainly probable cause for the officers to find out

9

J what is going on.

Second, there is no probably cause to stop

And that there was a pretext stop, and

10

I clearly the evidence does not support that.

11

I

12

I need for the Judge, for the Court, rather, to read

13
14

It was

I don't believe that there is any particular

Sierra, which is a pretext case.
THE COURT:

If an officer stops one who is

15

breaking the law for speeding or doesn't have a license

16

J plate, and decides that he will arrest him because no one

17

J is present to take the car, therefore they are going to

18

I impound the car, is it your position that then the police

19

I have the right to search every part of the car, luggage,

20

I and books and everything in it without a search warrant,

21

I just simply because they have impounded the car and now

22

I they have a right to an inventory search, to search

23

J either for weapons or valuables?

24

MR. LEMCKE: Your Honor, I think they not only

25

I have a right but a duty both to the owner of the vehicle
16

1

I and themselves,

2

I

3

I me and tells me that?

4

1

MR. LEMCKE:

5

1

MR. VALDEZ: Opperman is the oldest United

6

I States Supreme case.

7
8

MR. LEMCKE:

Is the Opperman vs. South Dakota.

It says that inventory search

I protects the officer against allegations that they will

9
10

THE COURT: And what is your case that guides

steal out of the car, as well as provides an inventory to
J the owner of the car.

11

THE COURT:

12

that you rely on.

13

I want the case the State relies on.

MR. LEMCKE:

14

I South Dakota.

15

I

That is what I want is the case

I believe that is Opperman vs.

MR. VALDEZ: Opperman is the general case in

16

terms of inventory searches, Judge. And I think if you

17

read that —

18

THE COURT:

Is that in here?

19

MR. VALDEZ: Yes, it is. You will learn

20

I something about inventory searches.

21

I

22

I says it was an inventory search.

23

J search incident to an arrest.

24

J terms of the inventory search, there is no law against

25

J what items were taken out. None was provided in the

The problem is, Judge, what we have here he
He also says it was a

Now, which is it?

In

17

1

J police report.

He says there is probably one somewhere,

2

J although that hasn't been produced by the State who has

3

I the burden of showing that it was a proper search.

4

I

5

I to, and you will see that in the State vs. Sierra, they

6

I have indicated, yes, a police officer may however stop an

In addition to that, Judge, the other thing is

7

automobile for a traffic violations committed in the

8

officer's presence. Well, it had two different plates on

9

it, although it was properly registered.

10

But it goes on to say in Sierra on page 977:

11

I "It is impermissible for law enforcement officers to use

12

J a misdemeanor arrest as a pretext to search for evidence

13

of a more serious crime."

14

J

It is our position that that is what occurred

15

I here, Judge, and the items that were found ought to be

16

I suppressed.

17

J

18

J did not have a driver's license.

19

I

20

I only didn't have a driver's license, but he had already

21

J been stopped and cited for that at one point.

THE COURT: He was arrested simply because he

MR. LEMCKE: He was arrested because he not

22

MR. VALDEZ: Your Honor, the testimony —

23

MR. LEMCKE: Your Honor, if I may finish.

24

THE COURT:

25

Let's hear one at a time. Mr.

I Lemcke.

I

18

MR. LEMCKE: He had been cited for this one
time previous. The officer used his discretion, arrested
him.

There was no one there to take the vehicle, the

vehicle was therefore impounded.

Incident to an impound,

it is part of a procedure, the vehicle was searched. Mr.
Valdez will tell us, "Well, there is some question about
the scope of the search because it was there."
The officer testified that the vehicle was
searched and inventoried.

Mr. Valdez asked him and, of

course, Mr. Valdez"s questions are not evidence:
didn't you also do it as part of the search?"

"Well,

"Yes, his

person was searched as part of the search."
"Also the car?"

"Yes, also the car."

But the

officer told us before that —
THE COURT:

Back up just a moment.

I am dust

saying, he was pulled over because there was a different
license plate on the front than he had on the rear. And
then when asked for his driver's license, he couldn't
produce one.
MR. LEMCKE:

In fact, he stated he had none and

had previously been cited for it.
THE COURT: And based on that, it was decided
to arrest him.
MR. LEMCKE: That is correct.
THE COURT: And jail him.
19

I I

MR. LEMCKE: That is correct.

As to the

2

J argument for pretext, I think if you will read Sierra

3

J carefully, a pretext is where officers working with a

4

I previous suspicion, or a previous desire to stop and

5

I search, find a misdemeanor or traffic that they can now

6

J stop someone for as a roost, as a pretext, as the word

7

I indicates, to then search the person or the vehicle.

8

J There is the underlying desires to search the vehicle,

9

I search the person, rather than make a traffic stop on its

10

I own face. That is not the case here and that is not the

11

J evidence in front of the Court.

12

THE COURT: We have a car with different

13

J license plates. We have the officer not remembering if

14

there was a registration or not. We have the defendant

15

without a driver's license, and so what would the

16

J reasonable officer do if he pulls anyone over at that

17

I point?

18

I haven't heard anything.

If he hadn't had a

registration, then it certainly would have been justified

19

I to impound the car.

20

I you don't know what the story is.

21

J

22

J Your Honor, and there was no one else there that could

23

J drive the car away.

24
25

You don't know if it is stolen, or

MR. LEMCKE:

Or if the driver was under arrest,

THE COURT: The problem I have with that, is
I everyone that is driving a car without a driver's license

I

20

arrested and taken to jail?

That is kind of — Maybe

they ought to be, but I am kind of shocked why — What's
the circumstances here?

There has to be something

articulable.
MR. LEMCKE:

I think that is before the Court.

The defendant stated, "Well, not only don't I have a
driver's license, but, look, here I have been cited for
it before and here I am back driving down the street
again."

Citation didn't work.
THE COURT: Well, give me your best case before

noon, if you don't mind, and I will take this under
advisement.
MR. VALDEZ: Thank you, Judge.

21

